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Union formation under conditions of uncertainty:





The link between economic forces and family dynamics has received renewed
attention in the present era of heightened uncertainty. Economic uncertainty has
usually been linked to unfavorable labor market circumstances, such as
unemployment and short-term contracts. Nonetheless, union formation may also be
affected by subjective appraisals of employment conditions, including employment
security and – acknowledging the prospective nature of uncertainty itself –
expectations of future employment.
OBJECTIVE
This study seeks to empirically disentangle the effects of the objective and subjective
sides of individual employment uncertainty on the entry into union.
METHODS
We apply event history techniques to longitudinal data taken from the Household,
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to examine whether and
how objective measures of employment uncertainty (labor market status and contract
type) and subjective measures (employment security and employment expectations)
are associated with entry into a first union.
RESULTS
Our results show that objective markers of employment uncertainty – unemployment
or temporary (casual) jobs – inhibit entry into a union for both men and women.
Furthermore, different appraisals of employment uncertainty affect union formation
across employment conditions. When individuals face objective employment
uncertainty while still expecting their employment situation to improve, either by
exiting unemployment (in particular among men) or retaining their jobs (among both
sexes), union formation is not necessarily postponed.
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CONTRIBUTION
We stress the importance of considering how different future expectations influence
family formation across different levels of objective uncertainty. The sole use of
objective markers of employment uncertainty provides only a partial, and possibly
inaccurate, perspective on union formation: the specter of the future also matters.
1. Introduction
The link between family dynamics and economic conditions has received renewed
attention in the era of uncertainty. Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2002) were among the
first to argue that individual-level economic uncertainty contributes to delayed union
formation and childbearing in early adulthood in favor of prolonged residence in the
parental home so as to better pursue either higher education or job stability (see also
Blossfeld et al. 2005). Globalization outcomes and the exponential rate of
technological change are increasingly hindering the ability to form independent
families (Mills and Blossfeld 2005, 2013). Comolli et al. (2021) suggested that the
recent rise in uncertainty stems from increased global interconnectivity. We
contribute to the growing literature in this field by analyzing the entry into a first
union – a crucial step in the family formation process. We argue that previous research
has given insufficient credit to the subjective side of uncertainty, especially regarding
the role of the future, in the study of family behavior under conditions of uncertainty.
Economic uncertainty has usually been considered an individual risk factor
primarily associated with unfavorable labor market conditions, such as
unemployment and short-term contracts (Kreyenfeld, Andersson, and Pailhé 2012,
Mills and Blossfeld 2013; Vignoli, Tocchioni, and Mattei 2020). In this view, spells
of precarious employment translate into feelings of economic uncertainty due to the
financial consequences for one’s current and future earnings, as well as the uncertain
futures associated with them (Scherer 2009; Standing 2011). In the realm of fertility
research, increasing attention has been paid to subjective measures of employment
conditions, such as the security of one’s job or, more broadly, personal economic
concerns (Kreyenfeld 2010; Bhaumik and Nugent 2011; Hofmann and Hohmeyer
2013; Fahlén and Oláh 2018). Aside from one’s perception of the one’s own
employment security, economic uncertainty is primarily defined as a lack of clarity
regarding future economic prospects (Beckert 1996; Bloom 2014; Vignoli et al.
2020a). In a context in which (bounded) rational calculations of opportunities and
constraints concerning family decisions are obfuscated by mounting uncertainty,
recent advances in family demography suggest that actors’ choices are influenced by
Demographic Research: Volume 45, Article 5
https://www.demographic-research.org 143
the “shadow of the future” (Huinink and Kholi 2014; Bernardi, Huinink, and
Settersten 2019), which is to say uncertain expectations of the future (Vignoli et al.
2020a).
We continue this debate by empirically disentangling the effects of the objective
and subjective sides of individuals’ employment uncertainties, the latter including
perceived uncertainties about the future, on the entry into a union. We outline this
approach by focusing on the entry into first union (both legal marriage and de facto
relationship) in Australia using longitudinal data from the Household, Income and
Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (hereafter referred to as the HILDA survey).
The objective side of uncertainty is operationalized through the respondent’s labor
market position, distinguishing between being unemployed or outside of the labor
force, having a permanent contract, a fixed-term contract, or working on a casual
basis, and being self-employed. The subjective side of uncertainty is operationalized
through the level of satisfaction over current job security, and two forward-looking
measures of uncertainty about employment prospects: the perceived chance of losing
one’s job if employed, and the perceived chance of finding a job if currently
unemployed. Australia is a somewhat unique context for this analysis in that it has a
relatively stable macroeconomic situation, while also having a comparatively high
rate of nonstandard employment contracts. These factors will facilitate our
investigation into the micro-level foundations of employment uncertainty in isolation
from macrolevel fluctuations.
2. Employment uncertainty and union formation
2.1 The objective side of uncertainty: Employment status and characteristics
The objective side of employment uncertainty – i.e., career instability related to
unemployment and/or temporary employment – may hinder or delay family
formation. Patterns of union formation represent adaptations to factors as accelerated
globalization, rapid economic restructuring (e.g., the gig economy and the decline in
stable jobs), and growing wealth disparities (Sassler and Lichter 2020). The
implications of the Great Recession (and its recovery) for union formation have
received a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years (Cherlin et al. 2013;
Schneider and Hastings 2015). In line with the globalization perspective (Blossfeld et
al. 2005; Mills and Blossfeld 2013), marriage – a resource-intensive and long-term
commitment – is likely to be postponed when people face employment constraints
until their outlook on life becomes more optimistic (Golsh 2003; Vignoli, Tocchioni,
and Salvini 2016). Furthermore, the rise in job precariousness jeopardizes financial
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resources, thereby potentially acting as a barrier to marriage or to a (often costly)
wedding ceremony (Livi Bacci 2008).
American research supports the argument that poor economic prospects are
associated with delaying union formation (see Sassler and Lichter 2020). A handful
of studies have focused on employment’s role in union formation in European
contexts by exploring the role of objective markers of employment uncertainty (e.g.,
Kurz, Steinhage, and Golsch 2005; Liefbroer 2005; Noguera, Castro Martin, and
Bonmati 2005; Piotrowski, Kalleberg, and Rindfuss 2015; Vignoli, Tocchioni, and
Salvini 2016). These studies suggest that fixed-term jobs, or only finding employment
on a temporary basis, significantly reduce the likelihood of entering into a union. For
example, Bukodi (2012) showed that job instability, or downward career trajectories,
depress union formation in the United Kingdom. Studies of Australia have reported
results in line with those found further afield: individuals with unstable employment
conditions, in particular unemployed males and/or those with lower levels of
education, are more likely to postpone union formation (e.g., Evans 2015; Heard
2011).
A stable source of income is an important precondition for family formation
(Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002). Individuals are increasingly experiencing (at the
very least) short spells of unemployment and must accept unstable, fixed-term
contracts in order to make ends meet. This career instability affects one’s capacity to
cover household expenses, or reliably predict being able to do so in the future, and
generates uncertainty about one’s future earning opportunities. Career instability may
thus discourage individuals from making long-term commitments and force them to
postpone leaving the parental home and establishing their own households (Billari
2005). A recent study of Dutch employees using a large-scale survey linked to register
data shows that low levels of income most clearly explain time-limited employment’s
negative association with family formation (van Wijk, de Valk, and Liefbroer 2021).
This finding accords with the literature which states that low-income parents avoid
marriage because they have not met its so-called “economic bar.” Gibson-Davis,
Gassman-Pines, and Lehrman (2018), for instance, suggest that, in the United States,
meeting this bar increases the likelihood of marriage.
The effects of objective states of employment uncertainty on union formation
may differ by sex. The male-breadwinner hypothesis posits that men are considered
less attractive husbands (or fathers) when they are unable to fulfill the role of the
family’s provider (Kalmijn 2011) – after all, establishing and maintaining a household
is certainly not inexpensive. In her uncertainty hypothesis, Oppenheimer (1988) adds
that uncertainty is embodied by (especially men’s) unstable careers, as indicated by
low-status jobs, unemployment, and irregular or temporary forms of employment.
These employment circumstances foster uncertainty about the future; not only as to
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whether the husband will be able to provide for it, but also regarding the lifestyle
habits he would be likely to develop. These objective states of employment
uncertainty may impede assortative mating and therefore delay marriage. From
another perspective, according to the sociopsychological uncertainty-reduction
framework proposed by Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994), getting married
may serve as a strategy for women to reduce uncertainty. Women may respond to
unfavorable employment prospects by choosing the “alternative career” paths of
wives and homemakers so as to lend structure to an otherwise uncertain life course.
The negative effects of time-limited employment on union formation are notably
clear among men in a variety of contexts, such as Italy (Vignoli, Tocchioni, and
Salvini 2016), Japan (Piotrowski, Kalleberg, and Rindfuss 2015), and the Netherlands
(de Lange et al. 2014). Among women, the literature reports somewhat conflicting
results, ranging from the negative effects of time-limited employment on union
formation in Italy (Vignoli, Tocchioni and Salvini 2016), Japan (Piotrowski,
Kalleberg, and Rindfuss 2015), to no effect in Germany (Kurz, Steinhage, and Golsch
2005) and the Netherlands (de Lange et al. 2014). In his detailed comparative study,
Kalmijn (2011) provided strong support for both the male-breadwinner hypothesis
and for Oppenheimer’s “career-uncertainty” hypothesis. However, the relative
importance of these hypotheses depends on a society’s levels of gender equality.
When women are the main caregivers and men the primary breadwinners, the
economic well-being of the household is more heavily dependent on the latter’s
market performance. Even when women achieve higher levels of education and
increase their earnings through high-quality jobs, their value in the marriage market
tends to depend only in part on their economic contributions to the
family. Accordingly, a detailed empirical test of the effects of employment
uncertainty on the entry into a union should ideally employ fine-tuned measurements
of the labor market status and gendered characteristics. As such, it is imperative to
segment empirical analyses of the effects of objective employment uncertainty on
union formation by gender.
2.2 The subjective side of uncertainty: The role of the future
The studies reviewed so far have examined the role of uncertainty on family dynamics
by focusing on individuals’ labor market conditions. A recent stream of literature has
introduced subjective perceptions of current experiences – such as insecurity
regarding one’s current job or financial situation – as a way to account for different
reactions to the same objective condition (Kreyenfeld 2010, 2015). In fertility
research, individuals’ perceptions have been found to play an independent role
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regardless of objective indicators of their past and current labor market situation (e.g.,
Bhaumik and Nugent 2011; Fahlén and Oláh 2018), thus moderating their impact on
fertility intentions (Vignoli, Mencarini, and Alderotti 2020) and behavior (Kreyenfeld
2015).
However, operationalizations of uncertainty with objective states of employment
and their perceptions tend to rarely acknowledge the very nature of uncertainty itself,
which primarily refers to a lack of clarity about one’s future prospects (Ranjan 1999;
Beckert 2016). The existence of uncertainty is one of the salient characteristics of a
capitalist society, and hinders the ability to make rational calculations concerning
future events (Beckert 2016; Beckert and Bronk 2018). Recent advances in family
demography posit that actors’ choices are influenced by the “shadow of the future”
(Huinink and Kholi 2014; Bernardi, Huinink, and Settersten 2019), and the so-called
“narrative framework” (see Vignoli et al. 2020a, 2020b) provides the concepts
necessary for operationalizing its influence in family dynamics. When people face
uncertain situations, they tend to consider not only past experiences (the “shadow of
the past”) and present status, but also future expectations, which represent what
people expect will happen based on the available information. The shadows of the
past and future find their synthesis in the narratives of one’s own future, which reflect
contingent plans for reaching certain goals in life.
When survey data provide information about individuals’ expectations, they may
be used as a proxy to grasp the effects of personal narratives of the future (Vignoli et
al. 2020b). For example, uncertain labor conditions may not be considered obstacles
to entry into a union in light of expected employment stability or an ease of recovery
from negative events. Alternatively, they may inhibit union formation in light of
expected employment instability or an expected inability to recover from negative
shocks. Following this framework, the present study contributes to the literature by
recognizing employment uncertainty as a prospective notion. A recent study
illustrates that, besides objective employment uncertainty and subjective perceptions
of individuals’ regarding their actual employment situation, actors’ family formation
behavior is also influenced by future expectations (Guetto, Vignoli, and Bazzani
2020).
The relationship between subjective uncertainty and union formation may be
nonlinear. Bhaumik and Nugent (2011) suggested a nonlinear relation between
subjective uncertainty and fertility, meaning that a moderate increase in one’s
personal perception of uncertainty would increase the chances of postponing, or even
avoiding, pregnancy. However, beyond a certain threshold, further increases in
uncertainty are less significant when individuals feel they have little to lose and may
instead even increase the probability of having children. Similar considerations may
be advanced for union formation. For instance, van Wijk, de Valk, and Liefbroer
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(2021) found higher marriage rates among women who perceived job insecurity,
thereby providing support for Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa’s (1994) uncertainty
reduction framework. A nonlinear pattern of this sort may emerge from examining
the subjective sides of employment in isolation or by scrutinizing how subjective
appraisals of employment uncertainty affect union formation across different
objective employment conditions. After all, it seems highly probable that the
objective and subjective sides of employment uncertainty interact with one another.
Within the same objective employment conditions, individuals’ subjective appraisals
of employment security and future expectations can prove pivotal in driving union
formation.
3. Australia: A case study
Australia provides an informative case study for a number of reasons. The country is
characterized by a stable economy. Indeed, the Great Recession of 2008 barely
affected its economy and labor market participation – for instance, unemployment
rates hovered at roughly 6% (against approximately 4% before the financial crisis).
From 2000 to 2016, female labor force participation rose from 65% to 72%, while
male participation in the labor market remained at approximately 82% (data from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics – Labor Force 2000–2016). Studying a relatively
stable labor market only slightly affected by macrolevel economic and financial
fluctuations allows us to acquire new insights into whether, and how, individual-level
objective and subjective markers of employment uncertainty influence family-
building processes.
Due to Australia’s high incidence of nonstandard employment contracts
(Buddelmeyer, McVicar, and Wooden 2015), this study transcends the simple
dichotomy between permanent or nonpermanent employment by considering
different forms of nonstandard contracts. We consider two forms of contingent
(Polivka and Nardone 1989) employment: casual employment and fixed-term
contracts. The former is relatively common in Australia: in 2019, there were 2.6
million casual workers, constituting 24.4% of total employees (data from the ABS –
Australian Bureau of Statistics). This contract type is especially prevalent among
young workers: in 2016, almost 80% of employees aged 15–19, and 40% of those
aged 20–24, were engaged in casual employment. Casual jobs are seen as insecure,
low paid, and resulting only in poor employment prospects (Buddelmeyer and
Wooden 2011; Watson 2013). These views are held despite the eligibility of casual
employees for wage premiums to compensate for irregular hours worked, the absence
of entitlements to various employment benefits, and the large-scale presence of
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individuals with a long history of supposedly “stable” casual employment (ACTU
2012). Casual workers are likely to experience earning fluctuations due to irregular
and insufficient work hours, suffer from poor mental health, and have lower levels of
job satisfaction (Buddelmeyer, McVicar, and Wooden 2015). Moreover, they are not
entitled to paid leave, including maternity leave. Conversely, fixed-term workers are
eligible for welfare-protection measures similar to those on permanent contracts, but
must face the uncertainty of possible redundancy at the end of each term.
Finally, due to the Australian legal system and the familial behavior of
Australian young adults, this paper focuses on both legal marriages (hereafter,
‘marriage’) and de facto relationships (‘de facto’). In Australia, these two union types
are similar both in terms of the law and how they are regarded socially. De facto
relationships, as defined by Australia’s Family Law Act of 1975–4AA, refers to a
couple cohabiting on a genuine domestic basis without being legally married. While
certain Australian states and territories ask couples to register a de facto relationship,
this is a request rather than a compulsory requirement. In practice, couples in de facto
relationships and legal marriages have equal rights before the law. In Australia, de
facto relationships are often a prestep toward marriage. In 2017, almost 80% of
married couples cohabited before marriage, a figure that was closer to 16% in the
mid-1970s (ABS data). McDonald and Evans (2003) found a similar pattern between
marriage and de facto relationships when comparing several Australian cohorts. A de
facto relationship can thus be seen as a “try before you buy” phase (Perelli-Harris et
al. 2014). For this reason, and since we are studying the transition to a first union
(which is likely to be de facto), we consider first union to be either a de facto
relationship or a legal marriage, whichever occurs first.
4. Research questions
Based on the literature review outlined so far, we pose three main research questions
to be separately tested for men and women:
1) How do objective conditions of employment uncertainty matter for union
formation?
We hypothesize that there is a greater chance of union formation among those
with more stable employment conditions, i.e., those with lower objective uncertainty
(Hp 1.a). Among workers in nonstandard employment, we expect a reduced chance
of union formation for workers in casual employment compared to those with fixed-
term contracts due to the differences in available safety nets (Hp 1.b).
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2) Do objective conditions of employment uncertainty still matter once subjective
appraisals of individual employment uncertainty, including future employment
expectations, are taken into account?
We hypothesize that the objective markers of employment uncertainty will
matter net of any markers of subjective uncertainty (Hp 2.a). At the same time, we
expect those facing high levels of subjective uncertainty – especially when
operationalized through forward-looking measures – to have fewer chances of union
formation (Hp 2.b).
3) How do subjective appraisals of individual employment uncertainty, including
future employment expectations, matter for union formation across different
objective employment conditions?
We hypothesize that different appraisals of subjective employment uncertainty
affect union formation across employment conditions. In particular, we expect the
probability of union formation to decline among those who may face low (or, indeed,
no) objective employment uncertainty, but experience high subjective uncertainty
compared to those facing low or no objective and subjective uncertainty (Hp 3.a).
Conversely, we expect a rise in the chance of union formation among respondents
facing high objective employment uncertainty – in terms of having fixed-term jobs,
casual employment, or being unemployed – but low subjective uncertainty compared
to those facing high objective and subjective uncertainty (Hp 3.b). Finally, we expect
a gendered effect when the respondent faces both high objective and subjective
employment uncertainty: women might tend to invest their resources in family life,
while men likely focus on the labor market. Hence, we hypothesize that there will be
an increasing chance of union formation in the case of high objective and subjective
uncertainties among women only (Hp 3.c).
5. Data and analytical sample
This paper draws on longitudinal data from the first seventeen waves of the HILDA
survey. HILDA is a nationally representative household-based panel study that began
in 2001. As the sampling unit, the household is broadly defined as “a group of people
who usually reside and eat together” (Watson and Wooden 2002). Each year, the
study collects information on economic, health, work, and family conditions from
each household member aged 15 and above. The data are collected primarily through
Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI). As a baseline (2001), 13,969 people
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from 7,682 households were interviewed. In 2011, a top-up sample of 2,153
households was added. Foreign diplomatic personnel, overseas residents intending to
stay in Australia for less than a year, and residents of institutions and other nonprivate
dwellings are excluded from the sample.3
We considered individuals aged between 15–35 as being able to enter into their
first unions (9,459 individuals who had never before been in a legal marriage or de
facto relationship). We started at the age of 15 as, by law, 16 is the minimum age at
which a person can legally marry in Australia.
We further excluded those who would have been in education throughout the
entire observation period (449). Hence, we selected individuals who were, at least
potentially, active in the labor market (n = 9,010).
Our interest lies in both subjective and objective measures of uncertainty, and
their combined effect. In order to retain the same set of individuals for the entire
analysis, we discarded cases in which either the objective or subjective measure(s)
was absent (less than 5% of cases). Since we lagged the measures of one wave in
order to avoid reverse causality issues, we restricted the analysis to those with valid
information in at least two consecutive waves. Our final analytical sample contained
5,855 individuals (2,727 women and 3,128 men) for a total of 24,775 respondent-
wave observations.4 On average, each respondent has been observed for over six years
(for women: mean = 6.38, sd = 3.57; for men: mean = 6.78, sd = 3.78).
6. Measures
Outcome variable. Due to our focus on the transition into first union, we coded the
outcome variable as 0 (being single) or 1 (being in a union5).
Uncertainty measures. To test the effect of objective and subjective employment
uncertainty on union formation, we employed the following measures:
3 For more information on the sampling strategy, see Watson and Wooden (2002).
4 The reduction in the number of respondents in our analytical sample is consistent with HILDA’s average
sample attrition. For example, of almost 14,000 individuals interviewed in the first wave, 9,245 (66%) were
interviewed again in Wave 9 (Watson and Wooden 2010). These figures refer to the entire sample (those
aged 15 and over) while the present study focuses on young adults, a group more likely to be mobile than
the general population (e.g., due to relocation and/or going overseas for work for instance), potentially
increasing the average sample attrition. It is also worth mentioning that, in our case, the analytical sample
includes only those who reported valid information on all key variables of interest (namely subjective and
objective uncertainty measures) in two consecutive waves. The reduction in the number of cases is thus
due not only to sample attrition, but also to nonresponses to given questions. We performed a robustness
check for attrition bias, which provided confidence in the reliability of our estimates (see section on
robustness checks).
5 As discussed above, we refer to a ‘union’ as both legal marriage and de facto relationship.
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a) Objective employment uncertainty. We considered whether the respondent was
unemployed or outside the labor force. Additionally, HILDA differentiates
between permanent or ongoing contracts, fixed-term contracts, casual work, and
being self-employed. Due to the prevalence of young workers in casual
employment and the peculiarities of this type of nonstandard working contract,
we classified fixed-term and casual contracts as two separate forms of contingent
employment. Similarly, as being either self-employed or an employee represent
distinct employment conditions, we kept self-employment as a separate
category.6
b) Subjective employment uncertainty. We explored three possible subjective
measures: satisfaction over current job security, and two forward-looking
measures of employment uncertainty with respect to future employment
prospects.7
1) Satisfaction of job security. Q: “I want you to pick a number between 0 and 10
to indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with your job security.” The
question was put to those currently employed. Since the distribution of the
responses is highly skewed (available upon request), we have discretized the
variable around its median value into low satisfaction with job security (0–7)
and high satisfaction (8–10).
2) Chance of losing one’s job (ranging from 0 to 100). Q: “I would like you to
think about your employment prospects over the next 12 months. What do you
think is the percent chance that you will lose your job during the next 12
months? By loss of job, I mean getting fired, being laid off or retrenched, being
made redundant, or having your contract not renewed.”  The question was to
employees only (i.e., the self-employed were excluded).
3) Chance of finding a job (ranging from 0 to 100). Q: “I would like you to think
about your employment prospects over the next 12 months. What do you think
is the percent chance you will find a suitable job during the next 12 months?”
The question was put only to those unemployed and actively seeking
employment.
6 Following HILDA’s distinction between employer and self-employed, we consider as self-employed both
a “person who operates their own unincorporated business” and “employees of their own business” (the
so-called “own account worker”). In contrast, we consider an employee “a person who works for a public
or private employer and receives remuneration in wages, salary, a retainer fee from their employer while
working on a commission basis, tips, piece-rates or payment in kind”
(https://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/hilda/for-data-users/frequently-asked-questions).
7 Respondents were surveyed according to their employment status: the subjective measures referring to
the actual employment were put to those in employment, and the subjective measures referring to the
chance of finding a job were put to the unemployed.
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After considering the distribution of responses – highly skewed with peaks
around round numbers (available upon request) – and for ease of interpretation, we
discretized the expectation of losing one’s job into three categories: 0% chance, below
50%, and 50% and over).8 The expectation of finding a job was discretized into four
categories: “heavily discouraged at finding a job” (expectation of finding a job
between 0%–10%); “discouraged” (11%–50%); “optimistic” (51%–80%); and “very
optimistic” (over 80%).9
Sociodemographic characteristics. In the multivariate model, we controlled for
a native indicator (having been born in either Australia or New Zealand),10 age (in its
linear and quadratic form), parity (three levels: no child, one child, two or more
children), and the socioeconomic status of the respondent. Each respondent’s
educational level was coded at three levels (compulsory or below, diploma, bachelor’s
degree or above) and parental occupational level (highest level between parents) using
the ISCO-based classification mentioned below. We further controlled for the most
recent occupational level using the ISCO-88 one-digit level code for the current (at t-
1) or most recent type of occupation. We made a distinction between high-skilled
white-collar (ISCO codes 1, 2, or 3), low-skilled white-collar (ISCO codes 4 and 5),
high-skilled blue-collar (ISCO codes 6 and 7), and low-skilled blue-collar jobs (ISCO
codes 8 and 9). In an additional model specification, we also controlled for disposable
personal income. Except for the native indicator, all variables were time varying. In
our analytical sample, 35% of women entered their first union during our observation
period at the average age of 22.5 years – approximately 65% of whom already had
one child. Among men, 30% of the respondents had entered a union before the age of
35 (mean age of 24.02) and, on average, 55% were fathers by the age of 24. Table 1
8 With respect to the actual distribution of the perceived chance of losing one’s job (0–100 scale): 0%
chance corresponds to the median level; over 75% of the responses were between 0–10; and a 50% chance
of losing one’s job corresponds to the 95th percentile. We observed no relevant differences in the perceived
chances of losing one’s job when distinguishing by contract type.
9 50% and 80% chance of finding a job next year correspond, respectively, to the first and second quartile
of the actual distribution of the reported chances of finding a job (0–100 scale). No relevant differences by
contract type were observed.
10 Since there might be an association between not being native to Australia and the contract type (selection
effect) – in particular among young people with a temporary visa – we examined the share of nonnative
respondents by type of contract. We found that non-Australians accounted for 8.8% of casual workers and
10.4% of those with a permanent job. Moreover, as we considered only those who replied to at least two
consecutive waves of HILDA, we could only include those who had been living in Australia for at least
two years. This makes us confident that our results are not biased by a selection effect due to migration
status.
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reports the sample characteristics and the distribution of objective11 and subjective
measures of uncertainty by gender.
Table 1: Subjective and objective uncertainty measure (pooled data),
sociodemographics, and share of individuals who entered in first
union by gender
Female Male
Objective measure: type of contract
Not in Labor Force (LF) 8.38% 6.79%
Unemployed 14.43% 17.06%





Satisfaction of job security (0–10)* 8.06 (1.9) 8.05 (SD 1.88)
Percent chance of losing a job (0–100)* 11.17 (SD 38.00) 12.30 (SD 37.63)
Percent chance of finding a job (0–100)** 72.67(SD 26.61) 73.53 (SD 25.5)
Subjective measure recoded
Satisfaction Job security
Not in Labor Force (LF) 8.38% 6.79%
Unemployed 14.43% 17.06%
Low satisfied: 0–7 21.07% 20.70%
High satisfied 8+ 54.57% 52.34%
Self-employed 1.55% 3.11%
Percent chance of losing job
Not in Labor Force (LF) 8.38% 6.79%
Unemployed 14.43% 17.06%
Self-employed 1.55% 3.11%
No chance (0%) 40.80% 34.85%
Low chance (1–49%) 28.74% 31.49%
High chance (50%+) 6.10% 6.70%
Percent chance of finding a job
Employed 77.19% 76.15%
Not working, not looking for job 6.49% 5.24%
Heavily Discouraged (0–10%) 0.75% 0.73%
Discouraged (11–50%) 4.02% 4.16%
Optimistic (51–80%) 5.29% 6.92%
Very optimistic (80%+) 6.26% 6.80%
11 Pooling the data together, as we expected, casual workers are slightly younger than the average. Between
fixed and permanent workers, we observed no relevant age differences. Among women, for example, the
mean age of a permanent worker is 23.2, 23.0 among fixed-term, and 20 among casual workers.





Age (mean value) 21.46 22.11
Level of education
Compulsory or below 63.00% 67.56%
Diploma 17.68% 18.85%
Bachelor or above 19.32% 13.59%
Parental background
Low-skilled blue collar 7.20% 6.71%
High-skilled blue collar 5.45% 7.05%
Low-skilled white collar 20.22% 20.97%
High-skilled white collar 62.78% 59.98%
No information 4.35% 5.29%
Occupational level (current or most recent)
Low-skilled blue collar 7.99% 21.74%
High-skilled blue collar 1.33% 20.89%
Low-skilled white collar 62.17% 30.81%
High-skilled blue collar 28.51% 26.56%
Born in Australia or New Zealand 90.87% 90.51%
Parity
Childless 96.56% 98.87%
One child 2.31% 0.92%
Two or more children 1.13% 0.21%
Share of respondents who started a union 29.83% 35.39%
Note: The percentage refers to the lagged value as used in the multivariate model. * refers only to employees; ** the respondent
is a job seeker.
7. Methods
We used a discrete-time event history model to analyze the effects of employment
uncertainty on the likelihood of entering into a first union. We defined entering into
a first union either starting one’s (first) de facto relationship or legally marrying one’s
partner, whichever came first.
We estimated the following models:
Pr 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜷 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜸 𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1)
Pr 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜹 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜸 𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
(2)
Demographic Research: Volume 45, Article 5
https://www.demographic-research.org 155
Pr 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜽 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜸 𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
(3)
In these models, u represents the random effects, while X is the aforementioned
set of time-varying and time-invariant sociodemographic characteristics.12
We began by estimating the effect of actual employment conditions (i.e.,
objective measure of uncertainty) on the likelihood of first union formation (Model
1) so as to answer the first research question. We addressed the second question by
examining the expectations around the employment sphere (e.g., the subjective
measure) while controlling for employment conditions (Model 2). Lastly, to answer
the third question, we estimated the final model (Model 3) with both objective and
subjective measures using an interaction term to examine the role of subjective
appraisals of individual uncertainty across different objective employment
conditions.13 The three models refer to the same set of observations. Since we
considered three measures of perceived uncertainty, we ran models 2 and 3 separately
for each perception measure. As we suspected the effect would be strongly gendered,
we stratified the analysis by gender.
We computed the average marginal effects (AMEs) to interpret any changes
across groups (Mood 2010). AME expresses the effect on P (Y = 1) as a categorical
covariate changes from one category to another, or as continuous covariate increases
by one unit, averaged across the values of the other covariates introduced in the
model. The AME results of the multivariate model are available in Tables A-1–A-3
of the Appendix. For ease of interpretation, the results are reported graphically in
terms of predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals.
8. Results
8.1 Descriptive results on subjective and objective employment uncertainty
The data’s longitudinal perspective allowed us to verify whether the subjective
measures could be viewed as reliable indicators of employment positioning. Table 2
compares the response at time (t-1) with the employment condition in the following
wave by gender. As a reference, we also reported the transition probabilities between
employment conditions (i.e., being employed or not). We observed similar patterns
12 The analyses were conducted using Stata’s “xtlogit” command.
13 Since the questions about forward-looking uncertainty measures were not put to self-employed
respondents, we considered self-employment a separated category in all model specifications.
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for men and women. Nonstandard employment (casual and fixed-term) is by
definition uncertain (Polivka and Nardone 1989) and characterized by a lack of any
guarantee regarding its permanency. Indeed, roughly 15% of those in casual
employment are not employed the following year, against 10% of fixed-term workers
and 8% of those with permanent positions. The results for all three subjective
indicators show that respondents were able to correctly evaluate their condition. For
instance, increased optimism about the likelihood of finding a job was linked to a
higher probability of actually gaining employment. Of course, we cannot discard the
possibility that a respondent who feels secure about finding a job may actually have
some preliminary information about a job opening. However, feeling secure in one’s
position (perceived high job security satisfaction or low/zero chances of losing one’s
job) does not completely protect against actual job loss (which occurred in roughly
11% of all cases). We conclude that there is a sense in which subjective measures are
linked to the actual employment perspective, and that they are representative of a
realistic fear of the future. Prospective measures in particular (employment
expectations) seem strongly based on actual employment conditions, but they also
identify a distinct construct compared to objective measures.14
Table 2: Perceived uncertainty at previous wave and current employment
condition. Pooled data. Percentage by row and by gender
a) Female respondents
Current employment condition
Unemployed/Outside Labor Force Employed
Satisfaction of job security (t-1)
   Low satisfied (0–7) 15.90 84.10
   High satisfied (8–10) 11.31 88.69
Percent chance of losing a job (t-1)
   No chance of losing job (0%) 11.37 88.63
   1–50% chance of losing job 11.19 88.81
   More than 50% chance of losing job 17.32 82.68
Percent chance of finding a job (t-1)
   Heavily Discouraged (0–10%) 66.67 33.33
   Discouraged (11–50%) 48.23 51.77
   Optimistic (51–80%) 42.35 57.65
   Very optimistic (80%+) 31.06 68.94
Employment condition (t-1)
   Casual basis 14.72 85.28
   Fixed terms 10.11 89.89
   Permanent 7.79 92.21
   Self-employed 16.67 83.33
   Not employed 42.77 57.23
14 For a general discussion on the validity of subjective measures of employment insecurity, see Dickerson
and Green (2012).





Unemployed/Outside Labor Force Employed
Satisfaction of job security (t-1)
   Low satisfied (0–7) 18.34 81.66
   High satisfied (8–10) 11.53 88.47
Percent chance of losing a job (t-1)
   No chance of losing job (0%) 11.20 88.80
   1–50% chance of losing job 11.91 88.09
   More than 50% chance of losing job 19.09 80.91
Percent chance of finding a job (t-1)
   Heavily Discouraged (0–10%) 62.63 37.37
   Discouraged (11–50%) 55.52 44.48
   Optimistic (51–80%) 46.10 53.90
   Very optimistic (80%+) 32.39 67.61
Employment condition (t-1)
   Casual basis 16.18 83.82
   Fixed terms 10.43 89.57
   Permanent 7.79 92.21
   Self-employed 15.44 84.56
   Not employed 44.05 55.95
Note: The question regarding percent chance of finding a job was asked to those currently unemployed and active in the labor
market. The questions on chance of losing employment and job security satisfaction were asked to those currently working.
8.2 Objective employment uncertainty
The first model specification considers the link between objective measures of
uncertainty (i.e., the employment position and type of contract) and the likelihood of
union formation. Figure 1 depicts the predicted probabilities of objective labor market
positioning on union formation (AMEs are available in Table A-1). As hypothesized
in Hp1.a, the higher the level of objective uncertainty, the lower the chance of union
formation. Unemployment and being outside the labor force are associated with lower
chances of entering a first union for both men and women. In particular, among those
outside the labor force, the predicted probability of entering into a first union is 5.6%
among men and 3.1% for women, compared with 12% and 8.3%, respectively, for
workers with a permanent position.
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Figure 1: Probability of entering into a first union by employment
condition. Predicted probabilities
Note. Not in LF stands for “Not in Labor Force.” Results refer to Model 1. 95% CI are reported. Model controlling for origin, age
(quadratic form), parity, level of education, occupational level, and parental background. Results for the full model in terms of
AMEs are available in Table A-1.
The type of nonstandard employment is also relevant: the negative association
between individuals in temporary (casual) jobs and union formation is especially
notable. The difference in the probability of first union among casual and fixed
workers is approximately three points and is statistically significant for both genders
(8.5% among fixed-term male workers versus 5.9% among casual workers, and
10.3% versus 7.8%, respectively, among women). We found no statistically
significant differences in the chances of entering a first union between permanent
workers and those with fixed-term contracts – a highly substantial finding. Moreover,
it supports hypothesis Hp1.b as it evidences the importance of recognizing that there
is no simple dichotomy between holding a permanent position or not. The two types
of contingent contracts (casual and fixed-term) are indeed different. Casual
employees have no right to paid leave and tend to work more hours. Conversely,
fixed-term workers have similar employment protection as permanent workers and
have the right to ask for a permanent position after a certain number of years of fixed-
term employment with the same employer. We observed similar behavior amongst
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self-employed workers and those with permanent contracts, as well as noting no
statistically significant differences between unemployment and casual contracts.
The effects of the control covariates accord with previous studies (e.g., Evans
2015), thereby providing us with an indirect validation of the statistical model itself.
Age has a positive and nonlinear effect on the probability of starting a first union.
Being native, more highly educated, and having highly skilled jobs (ISCO codes 1, 2,
and 3) facilitate entry into a first union. Similarly, having a child encourages union
formation. The full results for the multivariate model can be found in the Appendix.
8.3 Subjective employment uncertainty: Satisfaction with job security
In support of Hp2.a, employment conditions remain strongly associated with the
chances of union formation after controlling for the level of satisfaction regarding
one’s current job security (see Appendix Table A-1 – Model 2). On the other hand,
satisfaction with job security seems unassociated with the transition into first union
for both genders. Consequently, Hp.2b is unsupported regarding the role of
employment security.
However, the role of subjective appraisals of job security appears important
when combined with the employment condition among women, although the
estimates were not always statistically significant at the conventional 5% level (see
Appendix Table A-1 – Model 3 for complete results). Women in permanent positions
with low levels of job security (score below 8) postpone entering into a first union
(AME of –0.012) as compared to their counterparts with highly secure permanent
positions – a finding which supports Hp3.a. In terms of predicted probabilities, the
chances of first union formation decline from 12% to 10.5% (Figure 2). Consistent
with the results discussed above – i.e., workers with fixed-term or permanent
positions have similar chances of union formation – having a fixed-term job that is
considered secure (job security satisfaction 8 or above) is not, statistically speaking,
different from holding a permanent position. When the fixed-term position is instead
considered insecure (below 8), the probability of union formation declines from
11.4% to 8.7%, thereby supporting Hp3.b. The subjective appraisals of job security
are therefore relevant for union formation among these nonpermanent workers.
Among female workers facing relatively high objective uncertainty (i.e., those
with casual contracts), the chance of union formation seems to increase when
uncertainty rises (the probability rose from 7.4% among highly satisfied casual
workers to 8.6% among less satisfied ones), even if said difference is not statistically
significant (p-value of equality constraint test of 0.20). Although statistically
imprecise, these results seem to support hypothesis Hp3.c in relation to the
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uncertainty reduction narrative (Friedman et al. 1994). This narrative states that, in
times of high uncertainty regarding one’s career path, individuals may instead seek
“certainty” in family formation.
Among men, we observed no statistically significant differences according to the
level of job satisfaction when comparing those with the same contract type.
Hypotheses Hp3.a/b are thus unsupported for men when we examined the role of job
security as a marker of subjective uncertainty.
Figure 2: Probability of entering into a first union by objective employment
uncertainty and perceived satisfaction of job security. Predicted
probabilities
Note. Not in LF stands for “Not in Labor Force.” Low satisf stands for “low satisfied of job security.” High satisf stands for “high
satisfied of job security.” Results from Model 3 controlling for origin, age (quadratic form), parity, level of education, occupational
level, and parental background. Results for the full model are available in the Appendix.
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8.4 Subjective employment uncertainty: Expectations of losing one’s job
The relevance of employment conditions holds after controlling for the expectation
of job loss, included as a forward-looking measure of uncertainty (see Table A-2 –
Model 2). This supports hypothesis Hp2.a. The estimations of perceived uncertainty
on union formation per se only partly support Hp2.b, and rather suggest the presence
of a nonlinear relationship with a U-shaped pattern despite the differences in the
estimated associations being rather small. With respect to someone with a 0%
expectation of losing their job, having a medium level of uncertainty (less than 50%
chance of becoming unemployed) is associated with the postponement of union
formation (AME of approximately –0.01 in Model 2 for both genders). Conversely,
those with high expectations of job loss do not statistically differ in entering a first
union than those with no chance of losing their job. Simply put, once the expectation
of finding employment becomes increasingly unfavorable, unions are postponed.
However, after a certain level (50% in our case), this negative association disappears
(AME tends toward 0).
Model 3 examines both objective and perceived uncertainties with an interaction
term (see Table A-2 for complete results) in order to investigate the importance of
forward-looking subjective appraisals of uncertainty for union formation across
different employment conditions.15 The predicted probabilities (shown in Figure 3)
seem to suggest a non-monotonic association between perceived uncertainty and
entry into a first union for both casual and fixed-term workers of both genders.
However, it should be noted that the estimates are not always statistically significant
at the conventional 5% level.
Among fixed-term female workers, the probability of union formation varies by
5 points across levels of subjective uncertainty. For those with a 0% expectation of
job loss, the predicted probability of union formation is 12.3%. This figure declined
to 6.7% for mid-level uncertainty (i.e., 1%–49% perceived chance of job loss) and
rose to 11.7% for high-level uncertainty (i.e., over 50%). Such differences across
uncertainty levels were also statistically significant at 5% (p-value of 0.018)
contrasting low and medium levels of uncertainty, and at 10% (p-value of 0.07)
contrasting medium and high job uncertainty. We observed a similar pattern –
although with lower predicted probabilities and no statistically significant differences
– among female casual workers: the predicted probability of union formation declined
from 8.3% among those with low uncertainty, to 7.0% for mid-level uncertainty, and
15 Pooling the data, the interaction terms with relatively few cases (i.e., less than 2% of data points) refer
to women with fixed-term contracts or permanent positions with high perceived chances of job loss (1.17%
and 1.59%, respectively), and men with fixed-term jobs with high chances of losing their jobs (0.9%). This
may well explain the relatively larger confidence intervals estimated.
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rose to 8.0% among those with high levels of uncertainty. These results support both
hypotheses Hp3.b and Hp3.c, which proposed an increasing chance of union
formation for females in case of, respectively, either very low or very high subjective
uncertainty added to preexisting objective uncertainty.
Figure 3: Probability of entering into first union by expectations of job loss
and objective employment uncertainty. Predicted probabilities
Note. Perceived chances of losing job. Not in LF stands for “Not in Labor Force”. Results from Model 3. Model controlling for
origin, age (quadratic form), parity, level of education, occupational level, and parental background. Results for the full model are
available in the Appendix.
Among casual male workers, we observed a decline in the probability of entering
into a first union from 6% (for those with no chance of job loss) to 5.1% (mid-chance),
and then an increase to 7.9% (high chance). The difference in probability between
medium and high levels of uncertainty was also statistically significant (p-value of
the equality constraint test equal to 0.029). These results support hypothesis Hp3.b,
which posited an increasing chance of union formation under low subjective
uncertainty while facing a certain degree of objective uncertainty. That said, they also
contradict our gender hypothesis Hp3.c, namely that only among women would there
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be an increasing chance of union formation in case of high objective and subjective
uncertainty. This finding among men deserves future investigation with larger
datasets. As it stands, we cannot here discard the possibility that this trend is due to
the relatively small-scale sample.
As before, we observed no statistically significant differences by levels of
perceived uncertainty among fixed-term and permanent male workers, although the
non-monotonic pattern observed above seems to emerge for both genders.
8.5 Subjective employment uncertainty: Expectations of finding a job
Unemployment status is negatively associated with the probability of union
formation. That said, the perceived chances of reemployment are important within
this group (see Figure 4 for predicted probabilities or Table A-3 for the full AME
results). Figure 4 clearly illustrates that reducing negative expectations about the
future (i.e., increasing the perceived chances of finding employment) also reduces
unemployment’s negative impacts. This trend was particularly evident among men.
Indeed, the probability of union formation increased from approximately 2.7% among
(heavily) discouraged unemployed workers, to 5.3% among those somewhat
optimistic of finding a job in the following year, to 7.7% among the highly optimistic.
As such, these findings provide clear support for Hp3.b. Among those with high levels
of both subjective and objective uncertainty – in our case the highly discouraged
unemployed – we noted a relatively higher chance of union formation among women.
However, the corresponding confidence interval was relatively large, thereby making
the estimation imprecise possibly due to high levels of heterogeneity within this
relatively small (in our sample at least) group. Regardless, this result partially
supports the notion that there is a tendency towards family formation among women
in cases of high uncertainty (Hp.3.c).
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Figure 4: Probability of entering into a first union by expectation of finding
a job and employment status. Predicted probabilities
Note: “No look job” stands for “Not looking for a job.” Results from Model 3. Model controlling for origin, age (quadratic form),
parity, level of education, occupational level, and parental background. Results for the full model are available in the Appendix.
8.6 The role of income
As discussed in the background section, the nexus between employment uncertainty
and demographic behavior may not only stem from the fear of an uncertain future,
but also from a lack of income. We did not include income in the main model
specification as we believed this would have masked the direct effect of objective and
subjective uncertainty on union formation (i.e., the effects we are most interested in).
Nonetheless, we reran Model 3 to include the level of disposable personal income
from any source as a mediator (in quartiles; see Tables A-4–A-7). This stepwise
approach has been recommended by recent studies of the nexus between employment
stability and family formation (e.g., van Wijk, de Valk, and Leifbroer 2021), and
highlighted in a meta-analysis summarizing European research findings in the realm
of fertility research (Alderotti et al. 2021). Among women, we observed a reduction
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in AME among those outside the labor force (from –0.064 to –0.047) and the
unemployed (from –0.049 to –0.033). Similarly, among men, the availability of
economic resources reduces unemployment’s negative estimations: the AMEs for
those outside the labor force fell from –0.067 to –0.050, and the negative impacts of
unemployment decreased from –0.029 to –0.012, thereby becoming not statistically
significant. We also observed a slight reduction among casually employed men (from
–0.024 to –0.016). Regarding subjective measures, the patterns described above
remained similar when accounting for income levels.
9. Robustness checks
The results remained substantively unchanged after running several robustness checks
(available upon request). We reran the analysis to include individuals up to the age of
50. Rather than only considering the condition from the previous wave, we further
included the employment uncertainty from two previous years (t-1 and t-2). We also
included those in education during the entire observational period in our analytical
sample (449). Despite these additions, our findings remained unchanged.
This study considers three different subjective measures of uncertainty. In order
to maintain the same analytical sample over the different specifications, we included
only the cases (or waves) in which the information on all key measures was available.
We reran the model without imposing this constraint either by using a different
sample for each model or by imputing the missing values. Once again, there was no
change to our results. We also separately ran the models on the employed or
unemployed. While the models were not fully comparable with those presented here,
the direction of the effects did not change. Moreover, we tested different cut-off points
for the subjective measures of uncertainty. For example, we recoded the chance of
finding a job as 0–20, 21–40, 41–60, 61–80, 81% and above. We further differentiated
between those satisfied with their level of job security into two categories: medium
satisfied (5–7) and highly satisfied (8+). Alternatively, while keeping two categories,
we changed the cut-off point to 5. We also split perception of job loss into six
categories instead of three: no chance, 1–20%, 21–40%, 41–60%, 61–80%, 81% and
above. Again, the results remained unchanged. We also tested the potential cohort
effects in the propensity of union formation, including the cohort as a moderator, and
yet the key variables of interest did not change. The low number of cases prevented a
triple interaction between objective and subjective markers of uncertainty and
cohorts. A different propensity toward risk could also have driven different reactions
to uncertainty. In the HILDA survey, a risk-aversion measure is available for only
one wave (wave 14). We reran Model 3 with a focus only on those who reported such
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information, and compared the model with and without risk aversion. We found no
statistically significant effects. Nevertheless, the role of person-specific
predispositions would be worth further investigation.
Furthermore, we performed an analysis of participants who withdrew from the
survey to check for potential attrition bias. We found that the main determinants
behind withdrawal were inactivity and not having children. Since our model
specifications already controlled for this, we can be reasonably confident about the
validity of our estimates.
As an analytical approach, we used a discrete-time event history analysis, which
is equivalent to a logit random effect model. As an alternative model specification,
we tested a fixed effect (FE) model. Since an FE logit model would have been
estimated only on those who entered into a union (i.e., only cases with a within-
individual change in the outcome variable), we ran an FE model with a linear
specification as a sensitivity analysis. The results were mostly unchanged in terms of
the direction of the effects, with just a slightly reduction in the estimated coefficients.
A final issue requires clarification. Entering into either a legal marriage or a de
facto relationship could be considered two competing events since the former might
imply a stronger commitment than the latter (Baxter, Hewitt, and Rose 2015).
However, both within our sample and elsewhere (e.g., Perelli-Harris et al. 2014;
Evans 2015), entry into a de facto union is often a first step toward marriage. In
several cases, the transition from single to de facto is followed (in a relatively short
amount of time) by the transition to marriage. Since the two events appear not to
compete with one another, and as both sets of couples have the same legal rights, we
decided to refer to both as a (first) union formation event. Nevertheless, for robustness
checks, we opted to run both a competing risk model for the two union types, and to
consider only legal marriage as entry into a first union. The results showed no specific
pattern suggesting different attitudes towards legal marriage and de facto unions.
Moreover, since our data showed that legal marriage often followed a de facto
relationship (i.e., we saw few cases in which the first union was directly a legal
marriage), we considered beginning both to be entry into first union so as to have
more robust estimates in our empirical strategy.
10. Conclusions
The present study is one of the first attempts to examine the effects of individual
uncertainty on family formation in a dynamic and prospective manner. We have used
detailed information on (un)employment states (or, markers of objective uncertainty),
along with job security and personal future employment expectations (or, markers of
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subjective uncertainty). This enabled us to open the black box, as it were, of the
heterogeneous effects of employment uncertainty on union formation behavior in
Australia.  Several insights emerged in response to our research questions.
Our first key finding was that, among those experiencing objective career
uncertainty, union formation is typically postponed by temporary (casual) jobs and
unemployment. This could be due to an inability to predict the nature and quality of
life while living with a partner in a de facto relationship or marriage, and whether
he/she would be able to sufficiently contribute to it financially. In other words, those
with better economic prospects are, as expected, facilitated in the process of union
formation. We also found that nonstandard employment workers should not be seen
as a unique group of workers – at least in Australia – and that there is no simple
dichotomy between having a permanent contract or not. The results clearly show that
those with nonstandard employment, but with a relatively low level of uncertainty
due to the structure of the labor market and the welfare system (i.e., fixed-term
workers), display similar family formation behaviors to those with permanent
contracts.
Our results suggest another key finding: subjective measures of uncertainty,
especially forward-looking measures that acknowledge the prospective character of
uncertainty, matter across the different employment conditions. Those facing
objective states of employment uncertainty should not be regarded as a monolith;
rather, we observed selection into union according to the level of individual
uncertainty faced. In situations of potential uncertainty, such as having a fixed-term
contract, change occurs according to the subjective appraisals of uncertainty. For
example, we found evidence of a significant delay in union formation among fixed-
term female workers with a degree of fear regarding job losses with respect to those
who have no expectations of job losses. On the other hand, when individuals face
some objective employment uncertainty, but still expect their employment conditions
to improve, such as by either exiting unemployment or retaining their jobs, union
formation is not necessarily postponed.
Conversely, those with relatively high levels of uncertainty tend to invest their
resources in family formation – a trend particularly visible among women. Our
empirical results highlight this while considering the relatively higher probability of
union formation among unemployed women with no expectations of finding a job in
the next 12 months – a condition resulting in a type of “double disadvantage.”
Similarly, we observed an increasing chance of union formation among female
workers with nonstandard contracts who are simultaneously dissatisfied with their job
security, as compared to their more satisfied counterparts. These results seem to align
with an uncertainty reduction narrative (Friedman, Hecthter, and Kanazawa 1994),
according to which some women have a tendency to ‘focus’ primarily on family life
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if employment uncertainty reaches too high a level (see also McDonald 2000). The
effects we observed among men seem to favor an interpretation of family formation
in which the male plays the role of the breadwinner. What seems to matter most
among men is having a job to support the family. For instance, among the
unemployed, there is an increasing probability of union formation if the respondent
perceives a greater chance of finding employment in the following 12 months. Among
the employed, by contrast, increasing the chances of losing one’s job reduces the
chances of union formation.
In a nutshell, we advance that in Australia entry into a union (legal marriage or
de facto relationship) is a step more likely taken by those with strong economic
prospects, or an option envisaged by those with very poor employment prospects as
a sign of stability in an otherwise insecure life situation. This nonlinear path
dependency between union formation and employment uncertainty is suggestive and
presents an interesting position from which to understand the nexus between
economic uncertainty and family formation.
Our study is not without limitations. First, despite the fact that subjective
evaluations were backdated by one year, perceptions of uncertainty might still be
endogenous with respect to the probability of union formation. A person in a stable
relationship – a condition that may well accelerate the likelihood of starting a union
– could well underestimate their level of labor market uncertainty. Vice-versa, those
in either an unstable or no relationship (or those “uncertain” of their family life) may
tend to project their unfavorable life circumstances by overestimate their uncertainty
onto the labor market. Random effects panel models only partly account for time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity. Selection issues may have been present due to
such latent traits as personality or risk propensity, which may have been associated
with ‘success’ in both the marriage and labor markets. Similarly, the selection into
part-time jobs might affect the nexus between uncertainty and demographic behavior,
which itself would be worth a separate investigation. While examining the interplay
between part-time jobs and employment uncertainty would go beyond the scope of
this paper, we believe that a deeper understanding of the role of part-time work may
provide further insights into our knowledge of family decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty, especially from a gender perspective (Laß 2020). Second,
due to the small-scale sample size, we could not further distinguish workers by, for
instance, the respective prestige of their job roles. However, we would expect that,
among the heterogeneous group of temporary workers, those with highly skilled and
top-level professions may be more materially and immaterially wealthy, thereby
increasing their desirability in the union market. In any event, our multivariate model
controlled for education level and the ISCO classification of current/recent jobs as a
proxy for skills levels. Finally, the effect sizes we observed were relatively small and,
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in some cases, not statistically significant. Again, this could be ascribed to the sample
size and the length of the observational period.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study advances the importance of
considering not only structural and objective employment conditions, but also how
perceptions of job security and different future employment-related expectations
influence union formation. In sociological and demographic studies, ‘economic
uncertainty’ remains an elusive and highly debated notion, often operationalized by
unfavorable labor market conditions. In economics, it is defined as the inability to
assign probabilities to the outcomes that influence one’s own economic situation
(Beckert 1996; Knight 1921), resulting in unreliable predictions of future economic
prospects (Bloom 2014). Yet the need to make decisions for the future remains,
regardless of whether uncertainty hinders this process (Beckert and Bronk 2018). Our
results suggest that narratives of the future (Vignoli et al 2020a, 2020b) – here proxied
by employment expectations – play an important role in union formation. We
therefore conclude that the sole use of objective measures provides only a partial, and
possibly inaccurate, perspective. The specter of the future appears central to union
formation behavior, at least in Australia. The use of prospective measures of
uncertainty thus offers a promising path of inquiry for the study of family life courses
in the era of uncertainty.
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Appendix
Table A-1: Probability of entering a first union. Subjective measure:
Satisfaction of job security. Average marginal effects. Stratified
by gender
Men Women


























Type of contract (t-1)
Ref. Permanent
Not in labor force –0.067*** –0.065*** –0.064*** –0.065***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Unemployed –0.029*** –0.028*** –0.049*** –0.049***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Casual basis –0.024*** –0.025*** –0.037*** –0.036***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Fixed-term 0.002 0.001 –0.012 –0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Self-employed 0.008 0.009 –0.003 –0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019)
Satisfaction of job security (t-1)
Ref. High satisfaction (8+)
Low satisfied (0–7) 0.006 –0.002
(0.006) (0.007)
Type of contract and satisfaction job security (t-1)
Ref. Permanent position and high satisfaction






Casual: Low satisfied (0–7) –0.020** –0.031***
(0.009) (0.009)
Casual: High satisfied (8+) –0.023*** –0.043***
(0.007) (0.008)
Fixed-term: Low satisfied (0–7) 0.004 –0.029*
(0.013) (0.016)
Fixed-term: High satisfied (8+) 0.004 –0.005
(0.009) (0.013)
Permanent: Low satisfied (0–7) 0.008 –0.012
(0.007) (0.011)
DEMOGRAPHICS
Age 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age squared –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Origin 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)


































1 child 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
2 or more children 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Level of education
Ref. Compulsory or below
Diploma 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Bachelor or above 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Current or most recent job skill level
Ref. High-skilled white collar
Low skilled blue collar –0.021*** –0.021*** –0.021*** –0.010 –0.009 –0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
High-skilled blue
collar –0.008 (0.008 –0.008 –0.045 –0.045 –0.046
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Low-skilled white
collar –0.017*** –0.017*** –0.017*** –0.017** –0.017** –0.016**






Low-skilled blue collar 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
High-skilled blue
collar 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Low-skilled white
collar 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
No info 0.014 0.014 0.014 –0.004 –0.004 –0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of individuals 3,128 3,128 3,128 2,727 2,727 2,727
Number of
observations 13,520 13,520 13,520 11,255 11,255 11,255
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Origin: born in Australia or New Zealand. Low-skilled blue collar: ISCO code 8 and 9; High-skilled blue collar: ISCO codes
6 and 7; Low-skilled white collar: ISCO codes 4 and 5.
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Table A-2: Probability of entering a first union. Subjective Measure: Chance
of losing a job. Average marginal effects. Stratified by gender
Men Women

























Type of contract (t-1)
Ref. Permanent
Not in labor force –0.067*** –0.070*** –0.064*** –0.069***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Unemployed –0.029*** –0.032*** –0.049*** –0.053***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Casual basis –0.024*** –0.024*** –0.037*** –0.036***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Fixed-term 0.002 0.001 –0.012 –0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Self-employed 0.008 0.005 –0.003 –0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019)
Chance of losing job if employed (t-1)
Ref: No chance (0%) of losing job
Low chances (1–49%) –0.008* –0.012**
(0.005) (0.006)
High chances (50%+) 0.003 0.001
(0.009) (0.011)
Type of contract and chance of losing job (t-1)
Ref: Permanent position and 0% chance of losing job –0.070*** –0.065***






Casual: 0% chance of losing job –0.026*** –0.032***
(0.008) (0.009)
Casual: 1–49% chance of losing job –0.037*** –0.047***
(0.009) (0.010)
Casual: 50%+ chance of losing job –0.006 –0.035**
(0.013) (0.017)
Fixed-term: 0% chance of losing job 0.004 0.004
(0.011) (0.014)
Fixed-term: 1–49% chance of losing job –0.010 –0.050**
(0.012) (0.020)
Fixed-term: 50%+ chance of losing job 0.002 –0.001
(0.019) (0.020)
Permanent: 1–49% chance of losing job –0.006 –0.004
(0.006) (0.009)
Permanent: 50%+ chance of losing job –0.010 0.001
(0.012) (0.018)






























Age 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age squared –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 Origin 0.023** 0.023*** 0.023** 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Parity (Ref. No child)
1 child 0.277*** 0.276*** 0.278*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102***
(0.04) (0.040) (0.04) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
2 or more children 0.050 0.048 0.05 0.049 0.047 0.047
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Level of education
Ref. Compulsory or below
Diploma 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Bachelor or above 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.017** 0.018** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Current or most recent job skill level
Ref. High-skilled white collar
Low-skilled blue collar –0.021*** –0.021*** –0.021*** –0.010 –0.009 –0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
High-skilled blue collar –0.008 –0.008 –0.009 –0.045 –0.045 –0.045
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Low-skilled white collar –0.017*** –0.017*** –0.017*** –0.017** –0.016** –0.016**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Parental background. Job skill level
Ref. High-skilled white
collar
Low-skilled blue collar 0.022** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021* 0.021*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
High-skilled blue collar 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.040***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Low-skilled white collar 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
No info 0.014 0.013 0.013 –0.004 –0.005 –0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of individuals 3,128 3,128 3,128 2,727 2,727 2,727
Number of observations 13,520 13,520 13,520 11,255 11,255 11,255
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Origin: born in Australia or New Zealand. Low-skilled blue collar: ISCO code 8 and 9; High-skilled blue collar: ISCO codes
6 and 7; Low-skilled white collar: ISCO codes 4 and 5.
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Table A-3: Probability of entering a first union. Subjective measure:
Probability of finding a job. Average marginal effects.
Stratified by gender
Men Women















Type of contract (t-1)
Ref. Permanent










Type of contract and perception of
chances of finding a job if unemployed (t-1)
Ref: Very optimistic of finding a job (more than 80%)
Not working, not looking for a job –0.052*** –0.016
(0.018) (0.019)
Heavily discouraged (0–10%) –0.069* 0.052*
(0.040) (0.031)
Discouraged (11–50%) –0.074*** 0.000
(0.022) (0.021)
Optimistic (51–80%) –0.041*** 0.010
(0.015) (0.019)









Age 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age squared –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Origin 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.016 0.016
(Born in Australia or New Zealand) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Parity (Ref. no child)
1 child 0.277*** 0.287*** 0.103*** 0.102***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.026) (0.026)
2 or more children 0.050 0.047 0.049 0.046
(0.055) (0.054) (0.032) (0.032)




















Ref. Compulsory or below
Diploma 0.009 0.008 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Bachelor or above 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.017** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Current or most recent job skill level
Ref. High Skilled white collar
Low-skilled blue collar –0.021*** –0.020*** –0.010 –0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
High-skilled blue collar –0.008 –0.008 –0.045 –0.045
(0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.028)
Low-skilled white collar –0.017*** –0.017** –0.017** –0.017**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Parental background. Job skill level
Ref. High skilled white collar
Parents. Low-skilled blue collar 0.022** 0.024*** 0.021** 0.022**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Parents. High-skilled blue collar 0.015* 0.016* 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Parents. Low-skilled white collar 0.007 0.007 0.017** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Parents. No info 0.014 0.014 –0.004 –0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of individuals 3,128 3,128 2,727 2,727
Number of observations 13,520 13,520 11,255 11,255
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Because the subjective measure is reported only for those unemployed, Model 2 and Model 3 are equivalent, since the
question about perceived chances of finding a job has been asked to only those who are unemployed and looking for job. So an
interaction term between this variable and type of contract is equivalent to include the subjective measure while controlling for
type of contract. For readability purposes we report only one set of coefficients.
Demographic Research: Volume 45, Article 5
https://www.demographic-research.org 183
Table A-4: Probability of entering a first union including personal income.
Average marginal effects. Stratified by gender
Women Men
Model 3 With income Model 3 with income
Type of contract
Reference: Permanent position
Not in Labor Force –0.064*** –0.047*** –0.067*** –0.050***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Unemployed –0.049*** –0.033*** –0.029*** –0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Fixed term –0.012 –0.010 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Casual basis –0.037*** –0.031*** –0.024*** –0.016**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Self-employed –0.003 0.005 0.008 0.015
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
Personal disposable income. (Ref. First quartile)
Second quartile 0.034*** 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Third quartile 0.046*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.008)
Fourth quartile 0.060*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011)
Demographics ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Number of individuals 2,727 2,727 3,128 3,128
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Models controlling for age, origin, level of education, parity, job skill level, parental background.
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Table A-5: Probability of entering a first union. Subjective measure:
Satisfaction of job security. Including personal income. Average
marginal effects. Stratified by gender
Women Men
Model 3 with income Model 3 with income
Type of contract and satisfaction of job security
(Ref. Permanent and high satisfied of job security)
Not in LF –0.067*** –0.049*** –0.065*** –0.048***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Unemployed –0.052*** –0.036*** –0.027*** –0.010
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Self-employed –0.006 0.003 0.010 0.017
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
Fixed Term: Low satisf 0–7 –0.029* –0.026* 0.004 0.006
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Fixed Term: High satisf 8+ –0.005 –0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Casual: Low satisf 0–7 –0.031*** –0.024** –0.020** –0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Casual: High satisf 8+ –0.043*** –0.038*** –0.023*** –0.014*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Permanent: Low satisf 0–7 –0.012 –0.011 0.008 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Personal disposable income. (Ref. First quartile)
Second quartile 0.034*** 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Third quartile 0.046*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.009)
Fourth quartile 0.060*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011)
Demographics ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Number of individuals 2,727 2,727 3,128 3,128
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Models controlling for age, origin, level of education, parity, job skill level, parental background.
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Table A-6: Probability of entering a first union. Subjective measure: Chance
of losing job. Including personal income. Average marginal
effects. Stratified by gender
Women Men
Model 3 with income Model 3 with income
Type of contract and chance of losing job
(Ref. Permanent position and 0% chance of
losing job)
Not in labor force –0.065*** –0.048*** –0.070*** –0.053***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Unemployed –0.050*** –0.034*** –0.032*** –0.015*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Self Employed –0.004 0.004 0.005 0.012
(0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011)
Fixed Term: 0% losing job 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Fixed Term: 1–49% losing job –0.050** –0.049** –0.010 –0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012)
Fixed Term: 50+% losing job –0.001 0.003 0.002 0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Casual: 0% losing job –0.032*** –0.027*** –0.026*** –0.017**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Casual: 1–49% losing job –0.047*** –0.040*** –0.037*** –0.028***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Casual: 50+% losing job –0.035** –0.030* –0.006 0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Permanent: 1–49% losing job –0.004 –0.003 –0.006 –0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Permanent: 50+% losing job 0.001 0.002 –0.010 –0.008
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013)
Personal disposable income. (Ref. First
quartile)
Second quartile 0.034*** 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Third quartile 0.046*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.008)
Fourth quartile 0.060*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011)
Demographics ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Number of individuals 2,727 2,727 3,128 3,128
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Models controlling for age, origin, level of education, parity, job skill level, parental background.
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Table A-7: Probability of entering a first union. Subjective measure: Chance
of finding a job. Including personal income. Average marginal
effects. Stratified by gender
Woman Man
base with income base with income
Type of contract and chance of finding a
job (Ref. Unemployed and very optimistic of
finding job)
No look for job –0.016 –0.015 –0.052*** –0.049***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
0–10 Heavily discourage 0.052* 0.049 –0.069* –0.063
(0.031) (0.031) (0.040) (0.039)
11–50 Discourage 0.000 0.000 –0.074*** –0.067***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
51–80 Optimistic 0.010 0.013 –0.041*** –0.036**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
Fixed Term 0.043*** 0.029* 0.007 –0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
Casual basis 0.018 0.008 –0.019* –0.024**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Permanent 0.055*** 0.039*** 0.005 –0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
Self-employed 0.051** 0.044* 0.013 0.006
(0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013)
Personal disposable income. (Ref. First
quartile)
Second quartile 0.034*** 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Third quartile 0.046*** 0.028***
(0.008) (0.009)
Fourth quartile 0.060*** 0.042***
(0.011) (0.011)
Demographics ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Number of individuals 2,727 2,727 3,128 3,128
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Models controlling for age, origin, level of education, parity, job skill level, parental background.
